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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Appeal from appellants• conviction for disturbing an assembly.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appel ]ants were tried and convicted in Logan
City Court for disturbing an assembly and were
fined $35.00 apiece.

They appealed to the District

Court and were convicted and sentenced to six
months in jail.

From the conviction and denial of

motions to dismiss and the motion to I imit the
sentence to that of City Court, appellants appeal.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants respectfully request the court
to set aside the conviction on the grounds of a
denial of free speech.

Alternatively, appellants

request the court to set aside the District
Court 1 s sentence which increased the punishment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 18, 1968, appel !ants attended a
pub! ic assembly (T 44) on the Utah State University
Campus sponsored by the so-called T.A.C.T. Committee
(Truth About Civil Turmoil) (T 18).

Appellant

Emanual Chima, a black student from Biafra attending Utah State University (T 146), and appellants
Charles and Pearl Powell, a black couple employed
at the lntermountain Indian School (Tl24), had not
met prior to this occasion.

They were the only

blacks in the audience.
The main attraction of the evening was Julia
Brown (T 18), who spoke for about an hour (T 20) on
the civil rights movement which she labeled a communist conspiracy.

Perhaps the most offensive

portions of her speech contained the constantly

3
repeated al legation that negroes are foolish dupes
of the communists (T 126) and that civi 1 rights
organizations are mere fronts for the party (tape).
The appellants sat quietly while Julia Brown spoke
(T 20) , even though they were upset by her accusations.

All the appellants had been active in the

civi 1 rights movement in the past (T 125).
When Julia Brown finished speaking, the
meeting was opened to written questions (T 20).
At that time Emanual Chima asked to make an oral
inquiry and was permitted to do so (T 25).

He had

said but a few words when Julia Brown retorted:
you giving a speech or asking a question? 11
(T 68).

Finally, after explaining that he only

wanted to make a few prefatory remarks, he managed
to complete his question (T 68).

Rather than

answer the question, Julia Brown reiterated that
there was no legitimate civil rights movement in
this country, and that it was all a communist conspiracy (T 68).
exchange (T 96).

This caused a mutually sharp verbal
Part of the audience began

threatening Emanual Chima (T

97).

He was surrounded

4

by a group of hostile people (T 97).

Then Charles

and Pearl Powell asked Julia Brown to answer the
question (T 125).

Much of the audience began to

shout back and forth and Julia Brown -- well
prepared for any contingency and apparently fully
expecting trouble -- drew a can of Mace from her
purse (T 80).

In spite of Julia Brown's provoca-

tive actions, the meeting returned to order (T 50).
The first written question was read as
fo 11 ows:

11

How do you know so much more than the

F.B.l.? 11 (T 50).

Julia Brown's reply contained

the following invitation:

II

. I want to know

how you know so much about the F.B. I., and I am
talking to the person who wrote this question. 11
(T 51).

Charles Powell indicated that he had

written the question and attempted to respond (T51).
At this point Julia Brown accused him of being a
trouble maker who had disrupted her meetings in the
past (T 51).

This was not true.

Pearl Powel I came

to the defense of her husband, and the audience
began to shout and argue.

Once again the Powells

and Emanual Chima were threatened with physical

5
ha rm (T 106, 109, 11 0) .

Pear 1 Powe 11 was hit on

the head by a woman with a purse (T 110), and
Charles Powel 1 was pushed by one of the complainants (T 110).
Julia Brown's speech was of such a provocative nature as would arouse the emotions and personal pride of black people (T 135).

The appellants,

in responding to her, were attempting to vindicate
theirselves and their race before an audience of
whites (T 134, 135).

During the question and

answer period Julia Brown repeatedly provoked and
insulted the appellants.
terms 1 i ke

11

For example, she used

b 1ack trash" (T 75),

negro race 11 (T 72),

11

d i sgrace to the

11

communists 11 , comrades 11 (T 78),

11

which would bring any person to his feet who had
any personal pride.
Appellants were tried and convicted in Logan
City Court and fined $35.00 apiece (record).

On

appeal to the District Court appellants moved to
set aside the convictions on the grounds of free
speech (T 6).

Appellants also moved for the

District Court to limit itself, in the event
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appellants were found guilty, to impose no greater
punishment than that imposed in the City Court (T 7).
Both motions were denied (T 6, 7).
Appellants were found guilty by the District
Court (T 152, 154, 155) and sentenced to serve six
months in the county jail (T 160).
ARGUMENTS
PO INT I
SECTION 76-52-1 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953,
IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND OVERLY BROAD IN
SCOPE, AND ON ITS FACE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
It is well established that a statute posing
a threat to freedom of speech and discussion must
be exact in its language and specifically directed
towards evils within the permitted area of state
control.

This limitation is required in order to

prevent curtailment of permitted activities constituting an exercise of free speech; Thornhill v.
Alabama 310 U.S. 88 (1940).

The power of a state

to abridge speech is the exception rather than the
rule.

Any restriction must find its justification

in a reasonable apprehension of danger to the state;
Herndon v. Lowry 301 U.S. 242 (1937).

Moreover,

7
the normal presumption of constitutionality of
statutes is 1 imited in matters related to first
amendment 1 iberties; United States v. Caroline
Products 304 U.S. 144 (1938).

On the other hand,

the accused does not have to sustain the burden of
demonstrating that the statute could not have been
written in a constitutionally permissable manner;
Thornhill v. Alabama, supra.
Section 76-52-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
provides as follows:
Every person who, without authority of law,
wilfully disturbs or breaks up any assembly
or meeting, not unlawful in its character,
is guilty of misdemeanor.
A similar statute to Utah's was reviewed in Cox v.
Louisiana 379 U.S. 536 (1965).

It provides in part

as follows:
Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of
the peace, or under circumstances such
that a breach of the peace may be occasioned
thereby . . . shall be guilty of disturbing
the peace.
In Cox, supra, a civil rights leader was convicted
for taking part in a demonstration with approximately two thousand negro college students
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protesting racial discrimination.

The students

assembled at the State Capitol building, marched to
the courthouse, sang songs, prayed, I istened to
speeches, and failed to disperse on a police order
that they had exceeded the alloted time for the
demonstration.

The United States Supreme Court

reversed the decision for infringing on the First
and Fourteenth Amendments rights of free speech and
assembly.

Justice Goldberg, speaking for the

majority, found the Louisiana statute overly broad
in scope and observed that when unpopular opinions
attract a crowd and necessitate pol ice protection,
constitutional rights must be protected in the face
of host ii ity to their assertion or exercise.

See

also Terminiello v. Chicago 337 U.S. I (1949) where
the court voided a South Carolina statute defining
criminal offense so as to permit conviction if the
speech stirred the people to anger, invited public
dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest.
PO I NT 11
SECTION 76-52-l UTAH CODE ANNOTATED WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED TO THE DEFENDANTS.

9
The legislature did not intend Utah law to
be used as a device to suppress speech or to
curtail the open debate and dialogue common to a
democratic society.

One of the functions of free

speech is to invite dispute.

A state may not

invoke criminal penalties for peaceful expression
of unpopular views.

Free speech may best serve

its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even stirs people to anger.

It may

in fact provoke social change by striking at prejudices and misconceptions.

For this reason speech

is protected from unwarranted censorship or punishment; Terminiello v. Chicago, supra.
In Edwards v. South Carolina 372 U.S. 229
(1963) the United States Supreme Court reversed
convictions of negroes charged with the breach of
the peace by finding a constitutionally protected
right of free speech.

The defendants, who had

peaceably assembled at the State House to express
their grievances, were arrested after failing to
obey a pol ice order to disperse.

IO
At page 702, the court said:
We do not review in this case criminal convictions resulting from the evenhanded
application of a precise and narrowly drawn
regulatory statute evincing a legislative
judgment that certain specific conduct be
I imited or proscribed. If, for example,
the petitioners had been convicted upon
evidence that they had violated a Jaw
regulating traffic, or had disobeyed a Jaw
reasonably I imiting the periods during which
the State House grounds were open to the
pub! ic, this would be a different case.
[citations omitted]. These petitioners were
convicted of an offense so generalized as to
be, in the words of the South Carolina
Supreme Court, 11 not susceptible of exact
definition. 11 And they were convicted upon
evidence which showed no more than that the
opinions which they were peaceably expressing were sufficiently opposed to the views
of the majority of the community to attract
a crowd and necessitate pol ice protection.''
PO I NT 111
BY INCREASING THE CITY COURT'S SENTENCE OF
EACH DEFENDANT FROM A $35.00 FINE TO SIX MONTHS IN
JAIL, THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES.
When a person convicted in City Court is
compelled to risk imposition of a greater sentence
by the District Court on trial de novo, a violation
occurs; Patton v. State of North Carolina

636 (1967).

381 F.2d

The Jaw does not confront one with

"grisly choice 11 of either abandoning his search for

11
legal redress or pursuing that right under the
hazard of increased punishment;
391 (1963).

v. Noie 372 U.S.

Moreover, the defendant does not waive

this protection; Green v. United States 355 U.S.
184 (1957).

The presumption of injury is irrebut-

able; Marano v. United States 374 F.2d 583 (1967);
Patton, supra.
POINT IV
BY INCREASING THE CITY COURT'S SENTENCE OF
EACH DEFENDANT FROM A $35.00 FINE TO SIX MONTHS IN
JAIL, THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATED THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES.
In Patton, supra, Justice Sobeloff of the
Fourth Circuit said at page 641:
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 1 ikewise compels a rule barring a
sentence in excess of the one invalidated and
this protection extends even to one seeking
to avail himself of a state's post conviction
remedies because of nonconstitutional errors
1n the original trial.
Anyone choosing not to appeal a conviction is
protected from an increased sentence once they commence to serve their term.

Thus, the threat of

heavier punishment falls solely on those who
utilize post conviction remedies.

This is an

12
arbitrary classification offensive to the equal
protection clause, Patton, supra.
POINT V
BY INCREASING THE CITY COURT'S SENTENCE OF
EACH DEFENDANT FROM A $35.00 FINE TO SIX MONTHS IN
JAIL, THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
As indicated before, many cases hold that a
sentence cannot be increased once service has commenced; United States v. Benz 282 U.S. 304 (1931);
United States v. Sacco 367 F.2d 368 (1966); United
States v. Adams 362 F.2d 210 (1966); Kennedy v.
United States 330 F.2d 26 (1964).
These decisions are not meaningfully dist inguishable from this case and, consequently, harsher
punishment after a trial de novo violates the
defendant's constitutional protection against double
jeopardy, Patton, supra.

See also Green, supra,

where the United States Supreme Court held that an
accused cannot be retried for first degree murder
following his successful appeal from his conviction
of second degree murder on the theory that the jury
impliedly acquitted him of the charge of first
degree murder.
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CONCLUSION
The defendants• convictions must be set aside
because of their constitutionally protected rights
of free speech and because of violations of due
process, equal protection, and double jeopardy.
Respectfully submitted,

BRIAN R. FLORENCE
JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants
203 24th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

